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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
CONF

1 OF 1

4 NOV 1970

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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

**Confidential**

4 NOVEMBER 1970  
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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 26 OCTOBER - 1 NOVEMBER 1970

Moscow (4028 items)

Tsedenbal Delegation in USSR	(0.4%)	10%
Notes to U.S. and Turkey on Air Violation	(--)	10%
Indochina	(5%)	6%
October Revolution Anniversary	(7%)	4%
China	(4%)	4%
Iran-USSR Gas Pipeline	(0.1%)	3%
Algerian Revolution Anniversary	(--)	3%
Middle East	(6%)	2%
Somalia Revolution Anniversary	(3%)	2%

Peking (3010 items)

CPV Entry in Korean War, 20th Anniversary	(19%)	36%
Domestic Issues [30 Oct. PEOPLE'S DAILY Editorial on Studying Mao]	(22%)	21%
	(--)	3%
Japan [Defense Statements]	(--)	10%
	(0.1%)	6%
[Socialist Delegation in PRC]	(0.02%)	2%
Indochina	(14%)	9%
Tanzania-Zambia Railroad	(--)	7%
Tanzanian Military Delegation in PRC	(--)	3%
Philippine CP Chairman Guerrero Statement on Mao's 20 May Statement	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

President Nixon's recent campaigning prompts a flurry of Hanoi propaganda which repeats and elaborates on earlier charges that his 7 October five-point proposal was not a serious attempt to solve the Vietnam issue but was instead aimed at influencing the outcome of the elections. Propagandists and the DRV and PRG delegates at the Paris session again stress that the President's proposal has been "totally rejected." And Hanoi on the 30th and 31st takes sharp issue with Western press reports that Administration sources have "disclosed" that the DRV "is paying serious attention" to the President's proposal and have found "attractive points in it."

Criticism of the President's proposal is included in some current Moscow propaganda on general U.S. foreign policy, including articles in PRAVDA on the 29th and IZVESTIYA on the 30th. Brief Moscow reports note the antiwar demonstrations President Nixon encountered in San Jose, California on the 29th, and TASS on the 31st observes that in his speech in Anaheim he expressed support for a "positions of strength" policy.

Peking takes note of the San Jose demonstration against the President in a 3 November PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article which maintains that the majority of the American people oppose U.S. actions in Indochina. It routinely predicts the growth of "revolutionary violence" in the United States and the downfall of "U.S. imperialism." The Commentator article does not discuss the President's Indochina policy, but Peking media continue to publicize foreign criticism of his five-point proposal.

The DRV economic delegation, continuing its annual mission to conclude aid agreements, left Moscow for Prague on 2 November. The delegation, led by Vice Premier Nguyen Con, had signed an aid agreement with the PRC on 6 October and with the Soviet Union on the 22d. A PRC-DRV trade agreement and several protocols on economic relations between the two countries are also reported to have been signed on the 31st.

## DRV IMPUGNS PRESIDENT'S MOTIVES, DENIES INTEREST IN PEACE PLAN

President Nixon's election campaigning is discussed in a number of commentaries, including a detailed analysis in a 31 October NHAN DAN

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article by Nguyen Huu Chinh,\* broadcast by Hanoi radio the next day. The article begins with the observation that "any U.S. President who wants to prove that his prestige is heightened and that the influence of his party is stabilized does not occupy himself with campaigning" in off-year elections. The author says President Nixon has been making careful preparations for this campaign for over a year and claims that his actions, abroad as well as at home, have been aimed at influencing the American voters: His West European trip early in October was an attempt to enhance his prestige, while his 7 October speech was intended "to dull the image of an arch-hawkish Nixon who had sustained shameful defeats in his invasion against Cambodia in May and June of this year."

Other Hanoi and Front comment as well as the communist delegates at the Paris talks continue to charge that winning votes for Republicans was one of the immediate purposes of the President's 7 October speech outlining his five-point proposal on an Indochina settlement. Hanoi sees contentions by Administration spokesmen that the communists are seriously interested in the President's plan as part of the campaign effort. Thus, two radio commentaries on the 30th and 31st promptly rebut Western press reports that U.S. official sources have evidence of possible Vietnamese communist interest in negotiating on the basis of the President's plan. The broadcast of the 30th denounces the statements by U.S. officials as "a trick of deceitful propaganda, a part of the U.S. psywar campaign" aimed at deceiving the U.S. public and influencing the election.

The commentary on the 31st echoes some comment immediately after the President's speech when it takes issue with Administration arguments that the condemnation of the speech "only represents 'a traditional bargaining maneuver of the communists'" and that the President's proposal would eventually be considered. It calls "even more brazen" the Administration claims, reported in the Western press,\*\* that the Vietnamese

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\* Nguyen Huu Chinh has been identified in the past as "an editor" of NHAN DAN. He wrote on the Presidential election campaign in 1968.

\*\* Hanoi does not specify any particular press item and does not acknowledge that Administration spokesmen had reportedly cited East European sources and a 21 October Prague CTK item as evidence that the Vietnamese communists might be interested in the President's proposal. The CTK item, published in the FBIS DAILY REPORT on East Europe, 21 October 1970, page D 7, seems basically to be an endorsement of the notion of negotiations and an attempt to shift the blame for the present stalemate at Paris to the United States.

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are giving the five-point plan "serious attention" and that they probably want to negotiate on the basis of the President's proposal.

#### STANDARD TREATMENT ACCORDED PARIS TALKS; U.S. PLAN SCORED

The 90th session of the Paris talks on 29 October prompts the usual VNA account summarizing the communist statements--somewhat unsystematically--and almost totally ignoring the allied statements. The PRG statement, delivered by Nguyen Van Tien in Mme. Binh's absence in London, was carried textually by Liberation Radio, however. Inexplicably, in its account of the session VNA indicates that the allied delegates spoke last, when in fact GVN delegate Pham Dang Lam spoke first followed by Ambassador Bruce. VNA concludes its account with a one-sentence description of the allied spokesmen's remarks: "Speaking next, the delegates of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem puppet administration and the United States again tried to plead for Nixon's peace swindle which had been categorically rejected by the DRV and PRG delegations."

Both Tien and DRV delegate Xuan Thuy--back from his visit to Budapest--virtually ignored the substance of the President's five points, although both again explicitly voiced their rejection of the proposal. Thuy did refer cryptically to President Nixon's "raising the question" of a cease-fire and release of prisoners, claiming, however, that the President still refused to settle the important things--"independence and the right to self determination and real peace." In repeating the standard complaint that the President refused to set a time limit for troop withdrawal, Xuan Thuy did not acknowledge his call for a negotiated timetable for complete withdrawal.

While glossing over the President's proposal, both communist delegates spelled out the basic provisions of the PRG eight-point "elaboration"--U.S. agreement to withdrawal by 30 June 1971, so that there can be a discussion of the security of withdrawing troops and of the release of prisoners of war, and formation of a Saigon administration without Thieu, Ky, and Khiem and the subsequent establishment of a provisional coalition to prepare for general elections. Both also noted that the PRG proposal provides for a cease-fire after agreement on the basic points.

A 1 November statement released by a spokesman of the PRG delegation in Paris, carried by VNA on the 2d and by Hanoi and Liberation radios the next day, like PRG delegate Tien scoffs at

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the President for saying that the end of the war is near while in practice the United States and its allies are allegedly increasing war activities. The statement also charges that President Thieu's 31 October address to a joint session of the National Assembly was "a new and open characterization of the utter bellicose nature of the Saigon puppet administration and its obduracy in opposing a correct political solution for the South Vietnam question." It says Thieu "again urged" prolongation of the war "for another two or three years and again declared his opposition to a coalition government and neutrality."

CRITICISM OF U.S.  
WITHDRAWAL PLAN

Much of the current comment, like the communist delegates at Paris, glosses over the substance of the President's plan.

However, all five of the points--cease-fire, international conference, political settlement, troop withdrawal, and release of prisoners--are at least listed in a 1 November LPA account of an editorial said to have appeared in the English- and French-language newspaper SOUTH VIETNAM IN STRUGGLE, described as an organ of the NFLSV's Information Commission. And a Liberation Radio commentary on the same day explicitly acknowledges the President's call for a negotiated timetable for complete withdrawal as part of an overall settlement and seems to show particular concern to counter any favorable reaction to the proposal.

The Front broadcast says that "Nixon's trick of sowing confusion made a number of people erroneously believe he was being more reasonable than before--that is, that he was ready to withdraw all U.S. troops as demanded by the PRG." It goes on to claim that "Nixon's trick" was immediately exposed by public opinion and that everyone has realized that the principles spelled out previously add up to the "nonsensical demand for 'mutual troop withdrawal.'" The commentary sets out to document the charge

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On 2 November, Liberation Radio broadcast what it called a "recent" statement by Trinh Dinh Thao, Chairman of the Vietnam Alliance Central Committee, scoring the President's proposal. Thao takes specific note of the President's remarks on a cease-fire, a political solution, and the release of prisoners. He says routinely that U.S. withdrawal rather than a cease-fire is the way to stop the war, and he questions U.S. sincerity regarding self-determination for the South Vietnamese. He takes the occasion to deplore the Saigon prison system, saying he has first-hand knowledge since he has been a prisoner.\*

#### MME. BINH'S LONDON MEETING WITH GROMYKO PUBLICIZED

Both the Soviet and Front news agencies report that Mme. Binh met with Foreign Minister Gromyko during her visit to London, with LPA supplying more detail. LPA reported that in addition to reiterating Soviet support for the PRG's eight-point plan elaborated on 17 September, Gromyko said President Nixon's five-point proposal "is no novelty and is a repetition of the U.S. aggressive stand." The initial TASS report said merely that they had a "friendly conversation." But Moscow radio accounts on 2 November of a meeting between Mme. Binh and a group of British MPs notes that she told them Gromyko had assured the Vietnamese of "continued support"; and TASS on 2 November, reporting Mme. Binh's arrival back in Paris that day, quoted her as saying Gromyko had again declared the USSR's support for the Vietnamese struggle, "in particular" the PRG's 17 September proposal.

TASS also noted that in reply to a question regarding General Duong Van Minh's call for national reconciliation, made in Saigon on 1 November, Mme. Binh stated: "We are ready to establish contacts with any leaders, with the exception of Thieu, Ky, and Khiem, who come out for peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy in order to discuss problems of ending the war and forming a coalition government."

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\* Vietnamese communist media reported in November 1954 that Thao was among arrested representatives of a peace organization, and in September 1963 VNA noted protests against the arrest of a group of intellectuals including Thao.

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## PEKING PUBLICIZES CRITICISM OF U.S. FIVE-POINT PROPOSAL

Peking continues to publicize foreign criticism of President Nixon's 7 October proposal, but there is no new Chinese comment. The PRC's general reluctance to acknowledge the existence of the Paris talks is reflected in NCNA reports on Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh's 28 October arrival in London: the items identify her in her role as PRG foreign minister but make no mention of her position as head of the PRG delegation at the Paris talks.

The NCNA report on Mme. Binh's remarks to the press upon her arrival does mention, for the first time in Peking media, the PRG proposal seeking U.S. agreement to withdraw from South Vietnam by the end of June 1971. While not referring to the origin of the PRG proposal (in the eight-point "elaboration" of 17 September), NCNA reports that Mme. Binh criticized President Nixon for not replying to "our demand" for a total withdrawal by the end of June. NCNA quotes her as going on to "categorically and definitely" reject the President's five points and as reiterating the position that "if Nixon agrees to withdraw his troops by 30 June next year, we will refrain from attacking them while they withdraw and we shall discuss the question of American prisoners." Peking media first publicized a Vietnamese reference to the eight points on 16 October, in summarizing the DRV Foreign Ministry statement rejecting the five-point U.S. proposal.\* Also on the 16th, Peking took note of the substance of the PRG proposal regarding a three-party provisional coalition government in summarizing PRG President Phat's 14 October interview rejecting the U.S. proposal.

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\* Prior to 16 October, Peking accounts of Vietnamese statements consistently omitted references to the PRG's eight points. However, in keeping with the Chinese practice of carrying almost all statements from Sihanouk's government in full, Peking media carried the text of a Sihanouk government statement briefly referring to the eight points as early as 23 September. See the TRENDS of 14 October, page 14, and 23 September, page 1, for documentation of references to the eight points in PRC transmissions of statements by Sihanouk and his government.

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Chinese reports on Mme. Binh's activities predictably fail to mention her meeting with Gromyko in London on the 28th. But Peking media break with past practice to publicize the views of a Soviet-aligned East European nation on President Nixon's proposals on Indochina. Thus Peking on the 30th widely broadcast a report of comment on the proposals published in the Hungarian papers NEPSZABADSAG and MAGYAR NEMZET. (A 31 October NCNA report on the anniversary session of the United Nations exemplifies the usual Chinese practice: It cites only the views of the representatives from Albania, Romania, and African and Asian states.)

#### MOSCOW CONTINUES TO CENSURE PRESIDENT'S PEACE PLAN

Criticisms of President Nixon's 7 October peace plan are included in some current Moscow press commentaries which attack U.S. foreign policy in general. A 29 October PRAVDA article by Zhukov charges that the Nixon Administration is returning to the Dulles "positions of strength" policy and moving away from President Nixon's proclaimed "era of negotiations." Asserting that people in Washington are "applying the brakes" now "as if striving to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the 'era of negotiations,'" Zhukov cites Indochina as an example. He remarks that the United States is "boycotting" the PRG's 17 September initiative, the President having "haughtily ignored it" in his 7 October speech in which he put forth a plan of his own which is "deliberately unacceptable" to the Vietnamese.

In a similar article in IZVESTIYA on the 30th, Matveyev claims that the President said nothing about the conflicts in Indochina in his UN address and that in his 7 October speech he referred to peace efforts while at the same time "admitting" that he had sanctioned operations in Cambodia which broadened the war.

#### SOVIET BROADCASTS ASSAIL PEKING'S INDOCHINA POLICIES

Criticisms of China's policies on Indochina are included in some current Mandarin-language broadcasts over Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress. A 31 October commentary on the week of solidarity with Indochina being observed in the USSR notes briefly that no such week is being observed in China and charges that the PRC leaders are concealing from the

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Chinese public current activities in connection with the week. A commentary on the 29th, refuting "slander" included in an undated PEOPLE'S DAILY article about alleged Soviet use of science and technology for foreign aggression, cites the 22 October Soviet-DRV aid agreement among other manifestations of the constant strengthening of friendship between the two countries. It also recalls that the DRV defeated the U.S. "air pirates" with Soviet-supplied jet planes and anti-aircraft rocket systems.

Another commentary broadcast on the 29th, pointing out that the "U.S. imperialists" are pleased with the Chinese policy of sabotaging the unity between the USSR and China, recalls past instances of cooperation between the two countries, including cooperation at the Geneva conference which brought an end to the war in Indochina. The commentary takes the Chinese to task for subsequently opposing an anti-imperialist united front in support of the Vietnamese people.

#### U.S. "WAR CRIMES" PUBLICIZED IN STOCKHOLM, MOSCOW, UNGA

Continued publicity for the 22-25 October Stockholm meeting of the International Commission to Investigate U.S. War Crimes in Indochina includes a NHAN DAN article on the 31st which contains routine criticism of the Vietnamization and pacification policies. A Hanoi radio broadcast on the same day notes that a second meeting of the commission will be held in mid-1971. The fact that the Stockholm Conference, the body which set up the commission, will hold a session from 28 to 30 November was included in a message to Pham Van Dong, carried by VNA on the 3d, from the President of the Executive Committee of the Stockholm Conference, B. Svahnstrom.

The delegates to the Stockholm war crimes meeting attended a rally held in Moscow on 29 October to mark the "week of solidarity with the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia," called for by the WPC and observed in the USSR beginning on the 26th. Sponsored by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, the Peace Committee, and other groups, the rally was addressed by Lev Smirnov, RFSFR Supreme Court chairman who had attended the Stockholm session, and by the Indochinese delegates.

TASS and Radio Moscow report that the rally supported the Stockholm documents but give no details, merely saying that they exposed U.S. "crimes" as a violation of international law and as

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part of a "genocidal policy." The rally reportedly adopted a resolution calling for the withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops from the Indochinese countries and for recognition of the right of the Indochinese people to solve their own affairs. A VNA report adds that it supported the PRG's 10-points and eight-point "elaboration," the NLHS five-point program, and the FUNK program.

DRV DOCUMENTS            At this writing, TASS but not DRV media have  
AT THE UNGA               reported that on 3 November, at the request of  
                         the Hungarian permanent representative, DRV  
Government documents on "war crimes" committed by the United  
States under the Nixon Administration were distributed at the  
United Nations. TASS dispatches from New York on the 3d and  
4th cite the charges selectively.

It is noteworthy that Hungary was the country to circulate the documents. Xuan Thuy, DRV chief delegate at the Paris talks, had visited Hungary from 23 to 28 October. Limited Hanoi publicity for the visit included a cryptic VNA report on the 29th that he met with Foreign Minister Peter and Premier Fock on the 24th and 26th, respectively. On 1 November VNA carried an account of Thuy's remarks at a special session of the World Federation of Democratic Youth devoted to solidarity with the Indochinese.

#### COMMENT ON SOUTH VIETNAM PACIFICATION, ALLIED "CRIMES"

LPA reported on 29 October that the South Vietnam war crimes committee on the 15th issued a communique denouncing "crimes" committed by the allies in the past three months under their special pacification plan. The communique contains the usual listing of alleged crimes, including raids in various areas, bombings--particularly with B-52's--and the use of toxic chemicals, as well as repression by the Saigon government.

"Crimes" committed under the pacification program are also scored in a 30 October Hanoi domestic service broadcast of an "article" under the pseudonym Sa Nhan. Among other things, the article complains that "since July 1970, two regiments of the puppet Seventh Division have day and night attacked the revolutionary bases in Giong Trom and Mo Cay districts, Ben Tre Province." It claims, however, that the special pacification program is being successfully countered, citing excerpts

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from Western press reports as documentation. It brands as "lies" statements by President Thieu in June and on 27 September that security and order have been restored for 98 percent of the population and in 95 percent of the villages and hamlets.

### SIHANOUK HAILS PROGRESS OF WAR IN CAMBODIA

Sihanouk gave an account of the "excellent" current situation in Cambodia at a 2 November press conference on the occasion of the forthcoming 17th anniversary (9 November) of the proclamation of Cambodia's independence. As reported by NCNA on 2 November and by VNA on the 3d, Sihanouk repeated the claim that two-thirds of Cambodia has been "liberated"--five provinces and parts of the other two in the north and northeast. He claimed that in Kompong Thong Province only the city of Kompong Thom remains in "Lon Nolite" hands, and he added that the enemy has also suffered defeats in the Kompong Thom-Preah Vihear zone, which is of "very great strategic importance." He stated that the "Fishhook" and "Parrot's Beak" areas have been "liberated" by the FUNK, showing the failure of the U.S. action launched on 1 May. Claiming that the FUNK has encircled Phnom Penh, he added that it holds district towns within 10 miles of the capital.\*

Sihanouk then read a report to him and Penn Nouth by the three ministers said to be in Cambodia. Their report claims that FUNK committees elected by the people have been set up in liberated regions at village, town, district, and province levels and that in addition to the Cambodian Liberation Armed Forces, which are under the Ministry of National Defense, "militias" led by the Ministry of Interior have also been set up at village, town, district, and province levels.

### PRC-DRV TRADE PACT, PROTOCOLS ON MATERIALS AND TECHNICIANS

Following the practice of recent years, China and North Vietnam announce that on 31 October their representatives signed the annual agreement on the mutual supply of goods and payments.

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\* NCNA did not carry Sihanouk's assertion, reported by Western correspondents, that his forces would not try to capture Phnom Penh immediately for fear that this might prompt President Nixon to step up U.S. efforts on behalf of the Lon Nol government.

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However, this year's announcements, carried by NCNA on the 31st and VNA on 2 November, supply the additional information that four protocols were signed at the same time. The protocols include three concluded between the two governments, dealing with Chinese supply of materials to the DRV in 1971, PRC aid to the DRV in the form of "complete projects," and the living standard and working conditions of the Chinese technical personnel sent to Vietnam. A protocol on Chinese delivery to the DRV of equipment and materials for "complete projects" was also concluded between the PRC Commission for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries and the DRV Ministry of Foreign Trade. The agreement and protocols were signed by DRV Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Ly Ban and PRC Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Li Chiang.

A check of propaganda since 1965 indicates that no such protocols have previously been publicized. However, elements mentioned in the announcement of the protocols have appeared on previous occasions. The reference to the delivery of "complete projects" is similar to a statement in a joint DRV-PRC communique on the aid agreement concluded in July 1965; the communique indicated that the agreement called for aid to Vietnam in the form of equipment and "whole sets of installations" as well as economic and defense supplies. The role of Chinese technicians in the DRV, while not raised in authoritative Chinese statements in recent years, has occasionally been acknowledged in routine propaganda. For example, NCNA's account of the arrival in Peking on 12 September of the DRV economic delegation led by Nguyen Con noted that among those greeting the group were "Chinese engineering and technical personnel who took part in aiding Vietnam."

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## MIDDLE EAST

Moscow gives the Middle East debate in the UN General Assembly limited and relatively moderate attention.\* Soviet UN delegate Malik provides qualified endorsement of the Afro-Asian draft resolution, which otherwise is chiefly mentioned in the propaganda only by way of introducing criticism of the U.S. draft resolution, which is dismissed as an effort to further protract a political settlement. Comment depicts Israel and its "protectors" as in "moral and political isolation" in the Assembly, with speakers said to reject Israel's charges of UAR violation of the cease-fire agreement and to call for its resumption of contacts with Jarring.

Emphasis is placed on the 22 November 1967 Security Council resolution, with propaganda pointing out approvingly that many delegates view it as the only practical basis for a settlement. Moscow continues to insist that full Israeli withdrawal is essential for a peaceful solution. While urging resumption of the Jarring mission, Moscow offers no comment on the fate of the cease-fire agreement; the Soviet-British communique on Gromyko's recent talks in London does note that "it was agreed" that it is necessary to prolong observation of the cease-fire "for a period to be defined" with the agreement of the countries directly concerned.

## USSR SEES ISRAEL, U.S. "ISOLATED" IN UNGA DEBATE

**AFRO-ASIAN RESOLUTION** Consistent with its generally restrained treatment of the UNGA debate, Moscow provides little propaganda support for the draft resolution sponsored by 15 Afro-Asian states and Yugoslavia. The only explicit endorsement comes from Soviet UN delegate Malik, who points out in his speech on the 30th that the draft does not include "all the demands that the Soviet delegation believes should be made by the Assembly" on Israel and its patrons. He explains that the Soviet delegation, "nevertheless," views it "positively" since it contains confirmation of the most

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\* The volume of Moscow's propaganda attention to the Middle East this week is the lowest it has been since the first week of May.

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important provisions of the UN Charter and a demand for speedy fulfillment of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967.

The resolution is summed up without comment by TASS on the 29th; on the 30th TASS observes that while the U.S. delegation is "futilely" seeking supporters for its resolution, the Afro-Asian draft already has the support of 20 countries and more delegations are joining; on the 31st, TASS says that Nigeria officially submitted the draft, which had "already been supported" by a number of speakers. The account on the 29th notes that the draft reaffirms the impermissibility of conquest of territories by force; acknowledges that respect for the "inalienable rights" of the Palestinian people is a "preliminary condition" for peace; and calls for early fulfillment of Resolution 242. The draft resolution expresses full support for the Jarring mission, TASS adds, and it calls on the sides to instruct their representatives to resume contacts with Jarring. It also invites U Thant to report to the Security Council within two months and to the General Assembly "at a convenient time" concerning Jarring's efforts, and demands that the Security Council, should it be necessary, take steps "in conformity with the appropriate articles of the UN Charter" to insure fulfillment of Resolution 242. The only explicit mention of sanctions in current propaganda comes in a Radio Peace and Progress broadcast on 28 October which asserts that it is necessary to compel the Israeli "aggressors" to reckon with the will of the Security Council, and that the United Nations "really has the possibilities to do this." Peace-loving people have on numerous occasions pointed out, it says, that the UN Charter "makes it possible to pass sanctions, including the use of force," against the Israeli aggressors who are sabotaging the UN decisions.

The draft is mentioned in subsequent comment with no particular emphasis; it provides a peg for criticism of the U.S. draft resolution, and Sturua in the 1 November IZVESTIYA notes that Israel has warned that it will refuse to renew the Jarring consultations if the Afro-Asian resolution is approved. PRAVDA's Belyayev, who mentions the draft in passing in a 29 October domestic service commentary, goes on to suggest some doubt that the UNGA debate will prove fruitful. It "cannot be hoped," he says, that UNGA discussion of the situation "will solve all the highly complex problems involved in preparations for a political settlement." He offers the stereotyped conclusion that exposure of Israel's "aggressive course" and the "imperialist character" of U.S. policy during the debate will prove beneficial.

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SPEECH BY YOST, Dealing briefly with the U.S. draft  
U.S. RESOLUTION resolution submitted by Ambassador Yost  
on the 29th, TASS on the 30th notes that  
in contrast to the Afro-Asian draft, it contains no condemnation  
of the aggression and no statement about the impermissibility of  
continued occupation of Arab lands, nor any recommendation to  
the Security Council "to study the question of adopting  
measures that would insure implicit fulfillment" of Resolution  
242. TASS adds that Yost in his speech said the adoption of  
any measures against Israel regarding fulfillment of Resolution  
242 "would allegedly not be conducive to the achievement of  
peace." Characterizing the American draft resolution as  
pro-Israeli and as "ostensibly" supporting the Security  
Council resolution, TASS says it puts emphasis on "the  
restoration of the 'atmosphere of trust'" so that the sides  
could resume contacts through Jarring. By way of explanation,  
TASS notes that this idea was "expounded more frankly" by Yost,  
who accused the UAR of violating the terms of the cease-fire  
and "denied its right to defensive measures."

TASS' brief references to Yost's speech make no mention of  
other remarks on the missile issue, reported by the U.S.  
press, in which he declared that the United States had the  
concurrence of the parties and the major powers that a military  
standstill was an acceptable part of the cease-fire, and in  
which he accused the Soviet Union of having sent missile  
technicians to Egypt for combat roles, and held the USSR and  
the UAR responsible for standstill violations. Nor did TASS  
note his acknowledgment that there had been Israeli over-  
flights of Egypt, contrary to the terms of the cease-fire  
agreement.\* TASS also failed, in its account of the  
session, to mention Malik's reply to Yost's speech.

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\* Moscow has said little on the matter of air surveillance,  
although a broadcast in Turkish to Cyprus on 30 October echoes  
Cyprus communist press charges that American U-2 spy planes  
have been using the British sovereign bases in Cyprus for  
flights over the UAR "and spying for Israel." And a panelist  
on the 25 October domestic service commentators' roundtable,  
justifying UAR "redeployment" of missiles, had asked what  
else the UAR could do "when the United States had assumed  
the right to fly over the cease-fire zone and take daily  
photographs, and Israeli planes were also in the air."

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MALIK        "TAHB" 31 October account of Soviet delegate Malik's  
SPEECH        speech on the 30th fails to include his remarks,  
              reported in the Western press, on such specific  
              points as the establishment of demilitarized zones, stationing  
              of UN troops, Security Council or Big Four guarantee of a  
              settlement, and a settlement document which would have  
              international legal force. Nor have the Soviet proposals  
              for a settlement--including the elements mentioned by Malik--  
              been pressed in the propaganda since their discussion by  
              Primakov in the 15 October PRAVDA.

Malik does not explicitly call for sanctions against Israel in declaring that Israel's opposition to a peaceful settlement and its efforts to impose "unjust terms" on the Arabs while continuing its occupation compel the United Nations to "take new steps" to make Israel and its supporters take into account the will of the majority of the UN member states. Complaining of U.S. support for Israel, Malik cites new arms and financial aid and U.S. refusal to participate in the Big Four deputies' consultations. He claims that the U.S. draft resolution aims at further delaying or altogether frustrating a peaceful political settlement, making fulfillment of Resolution 242 "dependent on far-fetched demands for the creation of 'conditions of trust'" between Israel and the Arab countries. Conditions of trust, Malik counters, are full implementation of the Security Council resolution, withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories, and the establishment of a just and lasting peace. Echoing Gromyko's similar remarks in his UNGA address on 21 October, Malik calls for immediate resumption of Jarring's mission "without weighing it down by any invented conditions and demands," as he claims that the U.S. draft resolution attempts to do.

Drawing on the 15 July Supreme Soviet statement, without recalling it, Malik declares that the question is "either a further growth of the war danger in the Middle East\* or the adoption of measures that will insure a political settlement on the basis of complete fulfillment of the 22 November 1967 Security Council resolution." The formulation appeared in subsequent comment on the Supreme Soviet statement and is echoed in the sparse followup propaganda on Malik's speech.

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\* At this point the Supreme Soviet statement added "and this might happen if the aggressor is not curbed."

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**LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION** Briefly reporting the 3 November UNGA discussion, TABS that day notes the submission of a new draft resolution by Argentina on behalf of 20 Latin American countries. The draft calls, TABS says, for speediest implementation of Resolution 242, urges resumption of the Jarring contacts, and recommends prolonging the cease-fire for at least three months and taking "due measures for controlling its observance."

TABS adds--without further explanation--that a revised text of the Afro-Asian draft was submitted by Nigeria, "taking into account the opinions of most delegates" voiced at the session. In an earlier item on the 3d, TABS reports that the U.S. draft has "only been supported" by Liberia, which agreed to co-sponsor it, and notes that "it is said in UN lobbies" that the United States is exerting "backstage efforts to split the delegates" with respect to the Afro-Asian resolution, which contains "important provisions."

#### COMMENTATORS DISPARAGE U.S. CONCERN FOR PALESTINIANS

While Ambassador Yost's remarks on the Palestinian issue in his UNGA speech have been ignored by Moscow, panelists on the 1 November Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable do take note, skeptically, of remarks by Assistant Secretary of State Sisco on the Palestinians. Commentator Kudryavtsev claims that Washington's attitude toward the "Palestine liberation movement" has been basically to ignore the Arab people's legal rights in Palestine, while its "practical aim" has been to crush this movement. But now, Kudryavtsev says, it seems the U.S. leadership is examining possibilities of changing this course toward the Palestine movement "or else of supplementing it considerably while maintaining the same aims." He cites as an example Assistant Secretary Sisco's remarks at a press briefing in Hartford, commenting that "contrary to the traditions of those who direct U.S. foreign policy," Sisco said that there is indeed a Palestine problem which the United States does and will continue to take into consideration in any plan for a settlement.

Kudryavtsev notes that subsequently, articles along these lines appeared in the U.S. press, "even discussing various plans for a possible Palestinian state on the West Bank." As in rare past Soviet references to the idea of a Palestinian state, Kudryavtsev sees it as Israeli-controlled and thus suspect: He asserts that in the press discussions of the idea "the basic interests for the United States--Israel's interests--are not overlooked; the state is seen as a buffer and as a protectorate of Tel Aviv."\*

\* For a discussion of previous Soviet treatment of the idea of a Palestinian state see the FBI'S TRENDS SUPPLEMENT of 15 October, pages 1 and 2.

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Kudryavtsev adds that Washington, having always used the big stick against the Palestine movement, has now apparently decided to use the carrot as well, and is trying to flirt with the resistance movement, "using for this a certain fragment of it, especially the presence of an extremist wing within it"--charges he does not amplify. He claims that there is also "evidence" that the United States will seek to penetrate the movement and set up a base for American influence within it.

PRAVDA's Belyayev, picking up from Kudryavtsev, says that while Sisco spoke about the United States "allegedly changing its attitude toward the problem of the Palestinian people," Ambassador Yost said "not a word about this" in the U.S. draft resolution which he introduced. Belyayev fails to mention Yost's remarks on the Palestinians in his Assembly speech, in which he reportedly said the United States recognizes that the legitimate concerns and aspirations of the Palestinians must be taken into account, and that it has no preconceived idea about what form Palestinian participation in a settlement would take.

#### ROMANIAN SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIAN STATE

TASS accounts of the UNGA sessions make no mention of the Romanian delegate's speech in which, according to a 3 November

AGERPRES report, he called--as did Ceausescu in his 19 October speech at the UNGA jubilee session--for solving the problem of the Palestinian population "in accordance with its national interests." The Romanian ambassador went on to add that "this, in the last analysis, presupposes ensuring to that population its right to self-determination, that is, also the formation of an independent national state." While Ceausescu in his UNGA address did not support the idea of a Palestinian state, he did express such a view in a 16 June interview with a correspondent of the Paris LE MONDE. He called for a solution of the refugee problem "in conformity with their national interests and the satisfaction of the legitimate wishes of the Palestinian population, including the constitution of that population as an independent national state, if it so desires."

#### NEW TIMES URGES ADOPTION OF "CONSTRUCTIVE" PALESTINIAN PROGRAM

Assessing the state of the Arab world following Nasir's death, a Petrov article in NEW TIMES No. 40 (Russian edition 30 October) is notable for its suggestion that the Palestinians shed "extremist approaches" and adopt a "constructive program" for the

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achievement of their "realistic" and just aims which could enlist international support. Such a program, he suggests, would be compatible with a political settlement of the Middle East dispute, leading to solutions both to the problem of Israeli withdrawal and to that of achieving the Palestinians' "lawful rights." In what is believed to be a unique reference in Soviet media to Palestinian political activity on the West Bank, Petrov refers approvingly to such activity being "more noticeable" recently, and encourages a "pooling" of such action by West Bank and Gaza Palestinians and those outside the occupied territories as further pressure on Israel and its "foreign patrons."

Petrov says that the Jordan crisis gave an impetus to the development of "new trends" in the Palestinian liberation movement, and points to a "serious critical reappraisal" of the "extremist approach" to the question of a settlement adhered to by some Palestinian organizations. The Palestinian masses, he says, are convinced of the need to advance a "constructive program" of struggle for their rights; such a program would make it possible not only to unite the Palestinian national forces, but also "to enlist on the side of their just cause the broad international circles which support a political settlement" of the Middle East conflict. Such a program, he adds, would make it possible "within the framework of such a settlement" to solve the problem of Israeli withdrawal and to insure the Palestinians' lawful rights. Petrov here might be hinting that if the Palestinians together could arrive at a program which accepted a political solution to the overall dispute, those countries which support such a solution--including, of course, the USSR--could in turn lend their support.

Petrov stresses that it is of "greatest importance" for the Palestinians to arm themselves with an understanding of how "in the future to correctly wage the struggle" for the assertion of their independence and the restoration of their rights on Palestinian soil "without harming the rights of others."

#### BROADCAST FOR JORDAN INITIATED, NEW GOVERNMENT NOTED

A "Jordan Corner" program was inaugurated in Moscow's Arabic-language service on 31 October, adding Jordan to the Eastern Arab countries and areas--including the UAR, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, and the "Arab Peninsula"--to which Moscow devotes programs. Announcing the new weekly half-hour program, an Arabic-language broadcast on 24 October said the series, for Moscow's Jordanian

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listeners, would help "in strengthening the understanding and friendship" between the peoples of the USSR and Jordan. The inaugural broadcast featured an opening speech by the chairman of the Soviet society for friendship and cultural ties with countries of the Arab East, as well as a recorded talk by the Jordanian ambassador to the USSR, and a commentary dealing with the new Jordanian government.

The new government formed on the 28th had been briefly reported that day by TASS, which noted that it is headed by Wasfi at-Tall, "formerly prime minister several times." Reporting Husayn's message of designation to at-Tall, TASS on the 29th noted that he urged every effort to carry out the Cairo and Jordan agreements on normalization of relations between the "Jordanian authorities" and the Palestinian resistance movement, whose relations should be based on "mutual trust and cooperation." The same day, TASS reported at-Tall as pledging, in an interview with MENA, to carry out the agreement and pursue cooperation with the fedayeen.

The commentary on the inaugural "Jordan corner" program says Jordan public opinion and Palestinian circles received the formation of the civilian government as proof of the "general effort to restore conditions to their natural course." Moscow has ignored the strenuous Syrian criticism of at-Tall and the Cairo AL-AHRAM's accusation that the new premier "was the most prominent manipulator of last month's bloody crisis," as well as fedayeen opposition reported by Arab sources. The commentary, citing the Soviet attitude toward the Jordanian situation, recalls Brezhnev's remarks that the USSR exerted efforts to stop the conflict and that the Soviet Union believed foreign interference in the events in Jordan impermissible.

Recent comment on Jordan has continued the previous even-handed treatment: A Volskiy article in NEW TIMES No. 42 (Russian edition 16 October), noting reports of recurring clashes, said it must be remembered that passions ran high for a long time. Volskiy pointed out that the inhabitants of the Palestinian camps "destroyed by Jordanian artillery" find it hard to believe in the good intentions of Amman, and the latter, for its part, "is by no means sure of the loyalty of all guerrilla leaders." In implicit criticism of the government, Volskiy remarked that "patriotically-minded Arabs" advocate "positive changes in the Jordanian leaders' home policy." But he also pointed to fedayeen shortcomings, saying that as for the Palestinian movement, "many stress the need to eliminate the splitting, extremist tendencies to be observed in the activities of certain Palestinian organizations." He added that within these organizations there seemed to be growing realization of the danger of such tendencies. There is no doubt, he concluded, that the two sides still have many controversial issues to settle.



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In the 17 October PRAVDA, Vasilyev observed that the conflict introduced serious discord into Jordanian society as a whole. He noted the failure of Jordanian army units, "mainly recruited from Bedouin tribes," to accomplish the elimination of the fedayeen in Amman, and observed that his tour of the north revealed some areas still controlled by the Palestinians. Reviewing the efforts to arrive at a settlement, he accused "certain Jordanian officers, educated in England and the United States," of ignoring the cease-fire orders, but equally found "reckless fedayeen extremists, guided by the slogan 'the worse, the better,'" guilty of violating the agreements.

#### JOINT BIG TWO ROLE IN MIDEAST AGAIN REJECTED BY MOSCOW

The idea of a joint Big Two role in the Middle East is again rejected in a commentary in Arabic on 27 October. The broadcast claims that President Nixon, in his address to the General Assembly, tried "to make people believe that everything in the Middle East depends on the two big powers," and that on the basis of "such a preconceived false attitude, he evaluated the development of events." This U.S. attitude toward international relations has been rejected "more than once" by Soviet leaders, it says, and quotes Kosygin's remarks, in his 25 June 1967 press conference at the United Nations, that there cannot be any dictatorship by the United States and the Soviet Union and "we shall never consider such a viewpoint."

A broadcast in Arabic on 6 August had also recalled that Kosygin had "refuted the statement that the two major powers" should lead the world and dictate their conditions to it.\*

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\* See the FBIS TRENDS of 12 August 1970, pages 18 and 19.

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## U.S. AIR INTRUSION

## VIOLATION CALLED CONSEQUENCE OF U.S. BASES NETWORK

Following up the widely broadcast 26 October Soviet Government protests to the U.S. and Turkish Governments\* over the violation of Soviet airspace by a U.S. Air Force plane on the 21st, Soviet propaganda has played on the theme that the overflight was a manifestation of "the serious and constant threat to peace posed by U.S. war bases in foreign territories." Moscow has dismissed the U.S. explanation that the incident was an accident resulting from navigational errors.

Soviet media have not directly acknowledged the replies to the Soviet Government statements by the Turkish and U.S. Governments, dated the 27th and 29th respectively. They have, however, rejected points contained in the U.S. note in denouncing claims by "American propaganda" and by "representatives of Washington's official circles." Thus a TASS commentary on 29 October cited such sources for the contention that half of the U.S. airspace violations of Soviet territory during the past three years "were committed by hunters of polar bears" and remarked: "Indeed, they are hardly seeking out polar bears along the borders of Soviet Armenia!"

Since the initial 22 October TASS statement identifying the plane's occupants and noting the start of an investigation into the incident by Soviet authorities, Soviet propaganda has made no reference to the status of the one Turkish military and three American military officers or to U.S. efforts to obtain their release.

The propaganda replays without elaboration the assertion in the Soviet protest to the United States that U.S. military activities in the vicinity of Soviet borders do not accord with U.S. leaders' statements in favor of improving Soviet-American relations. Soviet broadcasts to Turkey stress that the failure of the Turkish Government to halt "provocative" U.S. military activities on the Turkish-Soviet border "can give rise to dangerous results and harm the good-neighborly relations between our countries." The air intrusion incident was mentioned briefly by Zhukov in a 29 October PRAVDA article raising the question of a return of U.S. foreign policy to the tenets of the

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\* Propaganda built around the Soviet Government statements amounted to about 10 percent of Soviet broadcast comment during the week ending 1 November. As much as a fourth of Moscow radio comment was devoted to the subject on 27 October, the day after the release of the statements.

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Dulles era. The air violation, he said, was a "reminder" that "the main sharp edge" of U.S. "aggressive policy is aimed against the Soviet Union."

HIJACKING            Soviet propaganda continues to refrain from suggest-  
TO TURKEY            ing any linkage between the U.S. air violation inci-  
                      dent and the Soviet effort to obtain extradition of  
the two men who hijacked a Soviet plane to Turkey on the 15th. The  
second hijacking of a Soviet aircraft to Turkey--by two Soviet  
university students on 27 October--remains unacknowledged in Moscow  
propaganda. However, IZVESTIYA chief editor Tolkunov, during a  
press conference in Teheran on 31 October reported by the Teheran  
radio, referred to "two" Soviet planes hijacked recently, going on  
to remark that if Turkey refused to return the hijackers to the  
Soviet Union, it will worsen relations between the two countries.  
Moscow propaganda on the first hijacking incident continues at a  
low level, TASS reporting demands throughout the Soviet Union and  
the world--as well as in Turkey itself--for extradition of the  
hijackers to the USSR for prosecution.

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## SALT

## SEменов REMARKS HIGHLIGHT PROPAGANDA; MOSCOW ASSAILS USIA

Moscow's low-volume attention to the second Helsinki round of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) features publicity for chief Soviet delegate Semenov's remarks at the 2 November opening ceremony. As reported by TASS, Semenov's remarks closely paralleled his statement of 16 April at the beginning of the Vienna round. Thus he stressed the "great importance" the USSR attaches to the negotiations and expressed hope that they will lead to a positive result--a hope also voiced by Gromyko in his 21 October speech before the UN General Assembly.

Semenov referred to Soviet support for a relaxation of international tension in the world, the consolidation of international security, and cessation of the arms race, which he says is being "fanned up by certain imperialist circles." In Vienna, Semenov had warned of "aggressive imperialist circles" interested in stepping up the strategic arms race.

The TASS account of the opening session in Helsinki reports that U.S. chief negotiator Smith expressed satisfaction over the resumption of the talks and observed that an agreement on limiting strategic arms would be "an important contribution toward international peace and well-being."

Strategic arms limitation talks, without specific reference to the Helsinki round, were mentioned briefly by Soviet representative Roshchin in the UNGA's First Committee on 2 November. As reported by TASS, Roshchin cited the talks--as well as Soviet support for a ban on the deployment of mass-destruction weapons on the seabeds--as confirmation of Soviet intent to seek agreement on partial disarmament measures.

USIA "CAMPAIGN"  
AGAINST USSR

TASS on 30 October picked up the preceding day's Washington POST story to the effect that USIA Director Shakespeare, in a memorandum to the President, had suggested that Washington withdraw from SALT and break diplomatic relations with the USSR on grounds of "an alleged construction of a naval base

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by the Soviet Union in Cuba." TASS said that according to the POST, USIA is seeking an opportunity to pursue "an anti-Soviet line" and this line has found expression in the agency's approach to major international problems. A Moscow radio broadcast for North American listeners on the 2d also cited the POST story on Shakespeare, concluding that a high-level Administration official could make such suggestions only because "Washington is clearly going back to power politics." Consistent with Soviet propaganda complaints over the past month about an active propaganda campaign in the United States to impugn the USSR's trustworthiness, the broadcast asserted that "practically every day now some Administration official makes a move designed to whip up anti-Soviet feeling and war hysteria."

#### EAST EUROPEAN COMMENT CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT AGREEMENT

While Moscow media have not yet commented on the opening of SALT, East European commentaries have evinced cautious optimism about the prospects for an eventual agreement. Most notably, a Warsaw domestic service commentary on 2 November mentioned a possible agreement on "forming some sort of permanent Soviet-American group, based on the strategic arms limitation talks, for maintaining continuous contact and informing each other about concepts concerning strategic armaments." A Budapest domestic service talk on 30 October stated that the USSR attaches particular importance "to limiting the strategic means which have the greatest devastating strength--intercontinental rockets, rocket-carrying nuclear submarines, and strategic fighter-bombers."

At the same time, some East European propaganda has pointed to the "cold war atmosphere" prevailing in Helsinki, allegedly as a result of U.S. actions including an intensified "propaganda campaign" against the USSR. An article in Warsaw's SLOWO POWSZECHNE on the 2d was critical, among other things, of Secretary Laird's "ultimatum" that the United States will not delay development of new weapons if an appropriate agreement is not reached in 12 months.

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An article in the Bratislava PRAVDA on 30 October said "there have been question marks" over whether the talks would open in the wake of the "no-confidence campaign" pursued in the United States vis-a-vis the USSR. Citing a Western press report to the effect that the Administration has sought to pressure the USSR into coming up with compromise proposals in two or three weeks, the Slovak daily decried this "extortionist language aimed at providing an alibi for wrecking the talks."

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## PRC SUMMIT PROPOSAL

### PEKING RESURFACES PROPOSAL AFTER FOUR-YEAR HIATUS

NCNA's report of the 1 November joint statement of the China-Japan Friendship Association and the visiting Japanese Socialist Party delegation contains the first reference in Peking propaganda since 1966 to the Chinese proposal for a world summit conference to discuss nuclear disarmament, first of all the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The joint statement has also been broadcast by Radio Peking to domestic and foreign audiences.

The summit-conference proposal dates back to 1963, when the 31 July PRC Government statement following the initialing of the partial test-ban treaty called for a world conference to discuss the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. In the government statement announcing the first Chinese nuclear test on 16 October 1964, the proposal was revised to include the suggestion that "as a first step" the conference reach an agreement that nuclear weapons would not be used. The proposal in this form was repeated in the communique announcing the second and third Chinese nuclear tests in May 1965 and May 1966. It recurred in other elite Peking propaganda during May and June, and Chou En-lai repeated it in his 28 July 1966 message to the 12th Gensuikyo-sponsored world conference in Japan against atomic and hydrogen bombs.

No elite Peking propaganda after Chou's message repeated the proposal. Most notably, it was absent from the communique announcing the fourth Chinese test--the nuclear-missile one--on 27 October 1966, and it has not appeared in any communiqués on subsequent detonations. (Anna Louise Strong, in a 20 November 1966 talk broadcast in English over the Peking radio, stated erroneously that the communique on the October 1966 nuclear-missile test had "again appealed" for a world summit conference on nuclear disarmament.) The dropping of the proposal from Peking propaganda coincided with the period in which the cultural revolution was under way and Peking withdrew from an active role in foreign policy.

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The 1963 and 1964 proposals were formally advanced in letters from Chou to the heads of governments of the world, PRC media in both instances publicizing the letters four days after the proposals were made in the government statements. Moscow, which is not known to have responded to Chou's letter in 1963, promptly tagged the summit proposal "propaganda" in a 3 August 1963 government statement. However, the 1964 proposal was acknowledged approvingly by Brezhnev at a Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship rally and by Gromyko at the UNGA in early December 1964. And Kosygin, in a 28 December 1964 response to Chou's letter, expressed "complete agreement with and support for" the proposal.\* Moscow's last endorsement of the proposal was in a 10 September 1965 Soviet-Romanian communique.

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\* For further background, see the FBIS SURVEY of 7 January 1965, pages 7-8.

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## PRC - JAPAN

Peking's recent comment and statements reflect its dual approach toward Japan in portraying a revival of Japanese militarism while at the same time engaging in "people's diplomacy" aimed at promoting pro-PRC sentiment in Japan. Peking's concern over an emergence of a rival political and military power commensurate with Japan's deepening economic influence in Asia has been expressed in two authoritative PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator articles in nine days attacking Japan's defense policies. In the same period, the Chinese have made use of the visit of a high-level Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) delegation to make a pitch for support within Japanese public opinion and to give a boost to pro-Peking forces. Reinforcing the signs of Peking's return to a pre-cultural revolution conduct of foreign affairs, the joint Chinese-JSP communique recalls Peking's long-dormant proposal for a summit conference on disarmament.\*

## PEKING DECRIES JAPANESE MILITARISM, NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT

Peking's general line of comment on Japan stresses, as it has done since the Nixon-Sato talks and communique last November, the theme that "Japanese reactionaries" are achieving success in their efforts to revive "Japanese militarism" and are doing so with the energetic assistance and under the aegis of "U.S. imperialism." Accordingly, Peking media exploit manifestations of concern in Japan for the qualitative or quantitative improvement of the country's Self-Defense Forces and instances of conflict or cooperation between Japan and the United States in the area of military affairs. Prime Minister Sato's November 1969 visit to the United States and the resulting communique, the extension of the U.S.-Japanese security treaty in June of this year, Japanese Defense Agency Director Nakasone's trip to the United States and his recent public statements on Japan's defense posture, and the release on 20 October of a National Defense White Paper are among the developments cited by Peking as indicating a revival of Japanese militarism and a consequent danger for the Asian and Pacific regions.

The two recent PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator articles stressed the theme that Japan has become a major economic power and now desires to become a military power of comparable status. Commenting on a 5 October Nakasone speech on the future course

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\* Discussed in this TRENDS under the heading "PRC Summit Proposal."

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of Japan, Commentator asserted on 24 October that internal economic contradictions in Japan were demanding--and attracting--military backing for the penetration of overseas resources and markets. Alleging that Japan's economic influence has extended to the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, Commentator described Japan's ambitions today as "greater than in the prewar period." Picking up the same central themes, a 1 November Commentator article on the 20 October National Defense White Paper contended that to solve Japan's domestic economic contradictions, the Japanese "reactionaries" will have to develop the armaments industries on a large scale and, "with their military strength as the backing, plunder other countries of their natural resources and seize overseas markets."

Both Commentator articles seized on Nakasone's request during his September visit for U.S. cooperation in Japanese development of enriched uranium and on the White Paper's contention that Japan could have some nuclear weapons of a defensive nature. Commentator asserted that there is an "intense eagerness" among Japanese militarists to possess nuclear weapons and that Japanese militarism "can easily use the enriched uranium produced under the cloak of 'peaceful purpose' for manufacturing nuclear weapons."

#### CHINESE-JSP COMMUNIQUE ASSAILS U.S.-JAPANESE "COLLUSION"

The 1 November joint communique by the China-Japan Friendship Association and the "fifth" JSP delegation to China\* harshly attacks "collusion" between the United States and "Japanese militarism" as posing "an imminent danger" to Asia and seeks to lend momentum to Peking's effort to promote pro-PRC sentiment in Japan. That the Chinese, desiring to acquire leverage against the Sato government, sought to find areas of agreement and to minimize differences is reflected in the communique's reference to "seeking major common ground while

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\* The communique was signed by Kuo Mo-jo and JSP Chairman Tomomi Narita. The fourth in this series of high-level visits by JSP delegations, in October 1964, was also headed by Narita. A lower-level JSP delegation preceded the current Narita visit to Peking for the observance of the 10th anniversary of the death of the late JSP Chairman Asanuma.

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reserving minor differences." This common ground consists mainly of militant opposition to both "U.S. imperialism"--in accordance with the long-standing claim that it is the "common enemy" of the Japanese and Chinese people--and the revival of Japanese militarism. The latter had not been mentioned in the joint communique on the visit of the fourth JSP delegation in October 1964.

The points of difference presumably relate to two other targets in Peking's polemical comment on Japan--the Soviet Union and the Japan Communist Party (JCP). Though neither is mentioned by name, anti-Soviet allusions endorsed by both sides include references to "superpowers" pursuing power politics and to the U.S. "collaborator," and both the Soviets and the JCP appear to be targets of a warning against "ignoring the revival of Japanese militarism." The latter warning also includes an anti-Soviet thrust against "befriending the Japanese reactionaries." The question of the JCP's role is left open in a passage in which the JSP states the principles guiding its effort to promote Sino-Japanese friendship and the restoration of diplomatic relations. The passage calls on the Japanese to form a united front of forces which "genuinely desire friendship" between Japan and China.

The Chinese side expresses thanks to the JSP for its opposition to "two Chinas," but there is no reference--like the one in the 1964 communique--to the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. The 1964 communique referred, as the recent one does, to the proposal for a nuclear summit conference; but proposals in the 1964 communique calling for a nuclear-free zone in the Asian and Pacific regions and for a collective security treaty among the countries in that region--including Japan, the United States, China, and the Soviet Union--are not mentioned this time.

JCP REACTION      The JCP organ AKAHATA on 3 November took sharp exception to the Chinese-JSP communique, arguing that it "virtually" introduced the "four-enemies theory" even though only U.S. imperialism

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and Japanese militarism are named in the document. AKAHATA interpreted the communique's reference to "U.S. imperialism and its collaborator, running dogs, and accomplices" as meaning not only Moscow--which it clearly does--but also the JCP. AKAHATA also took offense at the communique's references to those who "truly" and "genuinely" desire Sino-Japanese friendship as indicating a sectarian approach hostile to the JCP.

The effects of the bitter polemical exchanges between the Chinese and the JCP that erupted during the cultural revolution are evident in AKAHATA's scolding of the JSP for allegedly tolerating Chinese interference in Japanese leftwing affairs. The article renews the charges of Chinese "subversive attacks" against the JCP and "impermissible splitting and provocative activities" among Japanese leftists that have figured in the JCP's polemics with Peking in recent years.

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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

## HUSAK CONFLICT WITH ULTRA CONSERVATIVES COMES INTO OPEN

There is increasing evidence of a bitter struggle for power between the Novotny-style ultraconservatives--who now have their own publication--and CPCZ First Secretary Husak, whose generally moderate course apparently has Soviet blessings at this juncture. There is no confirmation in Prague media so far of a Western news report to the effect that ultraconservative Josef Jodas, who had held anti-Dubcek meetings in the pre-August 1968 period, wrote to Brezhnev earlier this year complaining about Husak's moderation, only to be betrayed by the CPSU General Secretary who sent the letter along to Husak.

Prague media in late October announced the dismissal of two ultraconservative figures from key positions. CTK reported on the 23d that Czech Republic Interior Minister Josef Groesser had been "released" from his post "in connection with his assignment to other tasks," which were not specified. His announced successor, Josef Jung, has not heretofore been listed in any of the federal or republic party or government leading bodies. An even more notorious figure from the Novotny era, General Otakar Rytir, according to CTK on the 27th, was "relieved" as Czechoslovak Government "commissioner for affairs concerning the temporary stationing of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia"--a post subject to greater Soviet control than most. The announcement treated Rytir more cordially than Groesser in noting that he was being given the post of chairman of the paramilitary youth organization, Union for Cooperation With the Army (SVAZARM), and in "thanking General Rytir for his work." It said the work of Rytir's former post relating to the Soviet troop stationing was now "transferred to the General Staff of the Czechoslovak People's Army."

POSTPONEMENT  
OF TRIALS

Other recent developments support the impression of a new clout in the influence of Husak, who in a speech on 29 June--following the expulsion of Dubcek from the party--had implicitly threatened a purge of ultraconservatives in the CPCZ Presidium who were exerting pressure for sterner action against the liberals. The Bratislava PRAVDA on 29 October in effect confirmed detailed reports from Belgrade that a trial of eight

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intellectuals, scheduled for mid-October, had been indefinitely postponed. TANJUG had said on the 14th that the postponement was due to the illness of the leading defendant, publicist and chess master Ludek Pachman, who had staged hunger strikes and attempted suicide during his current imprisonment.

Another leading prospective defendant was Ludvik Vaculik, author of the ultraliberal "2,000 Words" document which appeared in June 1968. Now, on the 29th, a commentary in the Bratislava PRAVDA ridiculed alleged Western concern over regime "terror" against intellectuals in Czechoslovakia, noting, among other things, "the mystery of whether or not there will be a so-called 'trial of eight so-called Czechoslovak intellectuals.'" Remarking that the trial was allegedly to take place "against the will of Doctor Husak and the President of the Republic," the commentary added: "Bad luck; no trial is taking place in Prague."

STATEMENTS BY      Leading conservative regime figures have also  
INDRA, MOC           manifested awareness of the moderate trend.

Thus CPCZ Presidium candidate and Secretary Alois Indra, in a Brno speech reported in ZEMEDLSKE NOVINY on 24 October, urged considerate treatment of intellectuals and others dropped from the party in the course of this year's "exchange of party cards." Indra reportedly said "only an anarchist or a political adventurer would say, as regards the intelligentsia, that everyone must pick up a shovel."

With regard to behavior toward those who have been dropped from the party, Indra "emphasized the need for sensitive differentiation," adding that social ostracism of such persons is "not heroism" but "petty-bourgeois cowardice." He urged his listeners to "give them a chance in their jobs and their social organizations to show in their daily lives what they really think." These remarks evidently alluded to a situation in which, according to Western news reports, the revelation by an intellectual that he has been dropped from the party often destroys any chance he might have for even an unskilled factory job.

An editorial entitled "Necessity" in the 26 October RUDE PRAVO by the paper's chief editor Miroslav Moc, also a member of the CPCZ Secretariat by virtue of that position, levels a strong attack at ultraconservatives--"some comrades" who "act as if they were embarrassed about" the Husak policy of criticizing the

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pre-January 1968 Novotny era as well as the post-January Dubcek liberalization. Moc charged that "some have even emerged who feel called upon to clear things up now, in 1970, because they allegedly have the moral justification to do so, having seemingly won this justification by doing nothing in 1968 and 1969." He added that these hardliners "make criticism of conservatism appear to be criticism of the left wing, so that by shouting about unity they might cover up their own violations of unity."

"LEVA FRONTA" The first issue of a new ultraconservative publication, LEVA FRONTA (LEFT FRONT), appeared in mid-October, apparently with only partial regime sanction. According to the Paris LE MONDE on 21 October, the new organ, published by an organization of the same name, appeared under the authorization of the Czech Republic Ministry of Culture and will probably appear at irregular intervals, since regular periodicity would require authorization by the Ministry of Interior.

According to the Belgrade POLITIKA on the 20th, the editorial in the initial "September" issue of LEVA FRONTA states that the organization of this name, since its founding in 1969, has become "a bulwark of healthy forces of a society which has been shaken by opportunist diversions." The first issue also contains polemical articles attacking what the publication considers to be ideologically softline articles in the official CPCZ monthly NOVA MYSL and weekly TVORBA.

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## YUGOSLAVIA

## PARTY CONFERENCE BACKS MOVES TO FURTHER LIMIT FEDERAL ROLE

The first Yugoslav party conference,\* which met 29-31 October in Belgrade, reaffirmed support for Tito's self-management course and pledged further efforts toward decentralization and republican autonomy to help grapple with the country's economic and political problems. It did so, according to the conference political resolution, in the face of "mounting pressures" for a reversion to "state interventionism" as a means of coping with burgeoning inflation, rising trade imbalance, and increasing tensions between the republics and the federal center. The vagueness of the conference conclusions, however, suggests that the gathering did little more than formalize general decisions already reached and that it was in large part an exercise in national unity designed for foreign as well as domestic consumption. Although Tito's government reorganization proposals were accepted in broad outline by the conference, many important specifics in the plan apparently remain unresolved.

**TITO'S SPEECHES** In both his opening and closing addresses to the conference, broadcast by Radio Belgrade on the 29th and 31st, Tito stressed the need for energetic action to solve Yugoslavia's pressing problems, while at the same time playing down the notion that the country is in "crisis" and in danger of economic and political disintegration. Describing such negative talk as "stupid," he told the opening session that "amendments and improvements in the system do not mean crisis; they mean progress and not retrogression." In his closing remarks he returned to this theme and made a spirited defense of self-management, rejecting the ideas of unnamed "prophets abroad and at home who say that self-management has failed." Those who predict that Yugoslavia will "crash" and "disintegrate," he added, "will be mistaken just as they have always been mistaken and will never live to see it." He went on to call for a renewal of the kind of unity that was prevalent during and after World War II, commenting that "no prophets" can harm a strong, united country with their "stupid ravings about Yugoslavia falling apart."

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\* The ninth congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists in March 1969 established the party conference as the leading party body in the interim periods between congresses.

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Foreign Minister Tepavac explored the same theme in his address to the conference on the 30th in noting "a close causal connection between our security and the impression regarding our domestic state of affairs" and in calling attention to "the unfavorable assessments abroad regarding conditions in our country." Our difficulties, he said, have become "an obstacle to our international prestige" and bring "joy to our enemies and misgivings to our friends."\*

Tito's expressions of displeasure over speculation about a developing crisis in Yugoslavia could reflect concern that some of his own previous statements may have aroused anxiety at home and added grist to foreign propaganda mills seeking to discredit the Yugoslav model of socialism. In dramatizing the need for a collective presidency in his speech at Zagreb on 21 September, Tito had himself alluded to the possibility of a "grave crisis" developing following his departure from the scene.

Despite Tito's efforts to underplay the crisis theme at the conference, he spoke repeatedly in his concluding remarks of an urgent need to carry out the government's reorganization proposals and to resolve the country's economic and political problems. If the new measures are not implemented "quickly," he said, "it

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\* For example, Tirana's ZERI I POPULLIT on 25 October carried a lengthy article entitled "The Yugoslav Leaders Admit the Serious Economic Situation and the Failures of Self-management Policy." Dealing with the 13th meeting of the Yugoslav party Presidium and quoting extensively from IANJUG reports of the proceedings, the article drew a picture of economic chaos and disintegration in Yugoslavia. Similarly, the Bratislava PRAVDA's weekend supplement on 23 October carried an article entitled "On the Topical Questions of Yugoslavia's Present Development in the Maelstrom of Problems." This article made the point that Yugoslavia's problems and "the dilemma around the party's tasks and mission" had originated "during the democratization process" which the party was not prepared to cope with. It added that "antisocialist theories and concepts penetrated the vacuum thus created, and the communists found themselves in defensive positions."

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will be a much more difficult situation." Such calls to action, also made by other conference speakers, seemed designed to counter criticism of the party for reacting too slowly to the current situation. According to a 29 October TANJUG report on the opening session, one representative mentioned that at pre-conference preparatory meetings some party members had made "critical observations concerning the lack of efficiency of the party and its slow reaction to a variety of negative manifestations."

CONFERENCE       The general nature of the conference resolutions,  
CONCLUSIONS   as carried by TANJUG on 31 October, indicates  
                  that many specifics of Tito's reorganization  
proposals have yet to be worked out. Thus the political  
resolution, entitled "The Present Political Situation and the  
Tasks of the League of Communists," approves the creation of  
a collective presidency but does not define its function, its  
composition, or Tito's role in it. The resolution merely notes  
vaguely that "it must be defined in parallel with the further  
elaboration of the political and socio-economic system, the  
accurate definition of the relations among the Federation,  
republics, and provinces and [the definition] of the competences  
of the Federation as well as the methods of implementing its  
functions. . . ." The document adds that "the results of all  
the work on these questions must be manifested in corresponding  
changes in the constitution," but it does not suggest specific  
changes. It is equally vague on the state of the new five-  
year plan, merely acknowledging the previously reported fact  
that it has been "postponed."

On the central problem of redefining the role of the Federation,  
the resolution supports movement toward further decentralization  
and republican autonomy: "The trend toward legislative  
centralization at the level of the Federation has to be  
halted; the implementation of the new role of the Federation  
demands a decisive restriction of normative functions of the  
Federation and the development of autonomous normative activity  
of work organizations and municipalities, provinces, and  
republics." The resolution goes on to advocate the removal  
of most of the investment functions of the Federation, with  
the exception of the fund used for extending credit to under-  
developed areas of the country. The conference document also  
calls for "a comprehensive review and accurate determination  
of the economic functions of the Federation and of all  
instruments which it uses in social reproduction. . . ."

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A TANJUG account of the 30 October political debate reported that in the future "the executive competence of the Federation" will be limited to "foreign affairs, state security, and safeguarding conditions for the nationwide market." By restricting the Federation's political and economic functions and passing some of them on to the republics, TANJUG added, the Yugoslav authorities hope to give further impetus to "democratization and de-etatization of the Yugoslav community."

TANJUG also reported that the conference gave "unanimous" support to the government's stabilization program as outlined by Premier Ribicic to the conference on the 30th. According to a Radio Belgrade account of the Premier's remarks, he explained the measures adopted the day before by the Executive Council to curb inflation and improve trade balances by freezing prices and imposing stricter controls over imports and consumer credit. Describing these measures as "temporary," Ribicic promised to appear before the National Assembly "in the shortest possible time with a concrete stabilization program."

SOVIET REPORTS      Very limited and generally uninformative Soviet coverage of the Belgrade conference ignores the meeting's decision to press forward with self-management and further bureaucratic decentralization. A Radio Moscow account on the 29th noted that in his opening speech Tito "concentrated, among other things," on "present-day tasks" and "the formation of a new collective body." It predictably made no mention of Tito's defense of self-management or his comments on those who would like to see it fail.

A TASS account of the conference outcome on 1 November reported that the political resolution "contains an analysis of contemporary development in Yugoslavia and outlines the tasks of communists in further developing Yugoslav society and strengthening the multinational Yugoslav state." The resolution, TASS added, "also points to the need to make communists more active and raise their responsibility for the formation and implementation" of party policy.

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